

MAKING ORGANIZATIONS TALK:

An Assessment of Military-Interagency Interoperability

A Monograph
By
Major John M. Metz
Infantry



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 95-96

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

19960924 015

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE MAKING ORGANIZATIONS TALK: AN ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY-INTEROPERABILITY IN TERROPROBABILITY			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JOHN W. METZ				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED <div style="text-align: right;">[DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2]</div>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS INTER OPERABILITY OPERATION PROVIDE COMMAND OPERATION SUPPORT NEED			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 52	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED			16. PRICE CODE	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

ABSTRACT

MAKING ORGANIZATIONS TALK: AN ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY-INTERAGENCY INTEROPERABILITY by MAJ John M. Metz, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph examines the interagency interoperability challenges faced by joint force commanders and planners during international humanitarian assistance operations (HAO). Three patterns or currents flow through the study. These currents include the commander's environmental awareness of his area of operations, organizational design, and development of interoperability enhancing procedures. By examining current doctrine and HAO case studies through the prism of these currents, one readily sees the crucial decisions and dilemmas facing joint force commanders and their staffs.

The monograph first introduces the major participants in humanitarian assistance operations. These participants fall primarily into three groups: non-governmental organizations, government agencies, and the military organizations. Next, a historical perspective of interagency interoperability during international (HAOs) provides examples of interagency coordination and confrontation beginning with the Vietnam War to present day operations. A doctrinal basis is formed in the next section by examining the three current in relation to joint and U.S. Army doctrine. The next section consists of Case studies of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE. The final two sections offer emerging techniques and procedures and conclusions.

The monograph's principal conclusions revolve around the joint force commander's initial assessment. This operational and environmental assessment will often dictate the joint force organizational design. That is why the joint forces commander must use all available resources, both military and civilian, to gain a true picture of the crisis. From this picture, an organization is formed that must reflect the operational environment, its participants and the requirements that will be placed on the organization. Finally, organizational design is not the end of its self. Joint force commanders and staffs must dictate the procedures, such as standard operating procedures, liaison requirements, and the use of standard communications equipment to promote unity of effort and legitimacy through interagency interoperability.


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES


MONOGRAPH APPROVAL


Major John M. Metz

Title of Monograph: Making Organizations Talk: An Assessment of
Military-Interagency Interoperability.

Approved by:


Colonel Gregory M. Eckert, MS, MMAS Monograph Director


Colonel Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS Director, School of Advanced Military
Studies


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate
Degree Program

Accepted this 19th day of April 1996

ABSTRACT

MAKING ORGANIZATIONS TALK: AN ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY-INTERAGENCY INTEROPERABILITY by MAJ John M. Metz, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph examines the interagency interoperability challenges faced by joint force commanders and planners during international humanitarian assistance operations (HAO). Three patterns or currents flow through the study. These currents include the commander's environmental awareness of his area of operations, organizational design, and development of interoperability enhancing procedures. By examining current doctrine and HAO case studies through the prism of these currents, one readily sees the crucial decisions and dilemmas facing joint force commanders and their staffs.

The monograph first introduces the major participants in humanitarian assistance operations. These participants fall primarily into three groups: non-governmental organizations, government agencies, and the military organizations. Next, a historical perspective of interagency interoperability during international (HAOs) provides examples of interagency coordination and confrontation beginning with the Vietnam War to present day operations. A doctrinal basis is formed in the next section by examining the three current in relation to joint and U.S. Army doctrine. The next section consists of Case studies of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE. The final two sections offer emerging techniques and procedures and conclusions.

The monograph's principal conclusions revolve around the joint force commander's initial assessment. This operational and environmental assessment will often dictate the joint force organizational design. That is why the joint forces commander must use all available resources, both military and civilian, to gain a true picture of the crisis. From this picture, an organization is formed that must reflect the operational environment, its participants and the requirements that will be placed on the organization. Finally, organizational design is not the end of its self. Joint force commanders and staffs must dictate the procedures, such as standard operating procedures, liaison requirements, and the use of standard communications equipment to promote unity of effort and legitimacy through interagency interoperability.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Doctrinal Assessment	12
Case Study Assessment	19
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT	19
Operation SUPPORT HOPE	22
Case Study Analysis	25
Emerging HAO Techniques and Procedures	29
Conclusion	35
Appendixes:	
A. Appendix A: USAID/OFDA Organization and coordination architecture	39
B. Appendix B: Command and coordination lines of communications between military and civilian agencies during HAOs	40
C. Appendix C: Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT Organizational Design	41
D. Appendix D: Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE Organizational Design	42
Endnotes	43
Bibliography	48

INTRODUCTION

According to Brian Robertson's article in, "Can the World Find aid in the private sector," the international community views the United States' as the only nation "capable of providing the financial, organizational, and material support for the rapidly expanding international humanitarian support requirements."¹ Whether this statement is true or not, President Clinton's 1994 National Security Strategy pledged United States support to the growing number of international humanitarian assistance operations.² Moreover, it is now the military planner's responsibility to anticipate and prepare for a continued role in future world-wide humanitarian assistance operations. Today, and in the future, soldiers, sailors, and airmen must increase their understanding of U.S. governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO) who habitually participate in humanitarian assistance operations. This knowledge will primarily be facilitated by service and joint doctrine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, through doctrine and application, can foster a better understanding between the U.S. military and those participants involved in humanitarian assistance operations. Through these common bonds, both the military and civilian agencies can strive for complete interoperability.

This monograph analyzes the civil-military interoperability requirements that commanders and staff officers must understand to support humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs) occurring outside the continental United States. The thesis' central question focuses on the current joint doctrine for the organization and operation of a joint task forces (JTF), and if this doctrine supports the interagency interoperability challenges of humanitarian assistance operations. As

an organization and vehicle for this study, the joint task force facilitates an examination of past, present, and future U.S. military interagency coordination means. In addition, the JTF has since the Gulf War been the organization of choice by joint force commanders to support overseas humanitarian assistance operations.

The monograph presents a study of civil-military interoperability by showing the key humanitarian assistance players and a historical perspective to establish a foundation for understanding military experiences with HAOs and the doctrinal lessons. Next, a doctrinal perspective is given. This perspective offers the current ideas concerning the humanitarian assistance operational environment, structure, and participants. The third area reviews case studies of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE. The case studies illustrate the challenges facing the joint forces commander. That is, the importance of understanding the operational environment, forming an organization that meets these environmental demands, and developing measures that foster interoperability between the organization and its environment. The final two sections include emerging HAO techniques and procedures (including training initiatives that assist commanders at all levels as they address HAO interoperability requirements) and conclusions

Three currents run throughout each section and tie the concepts of interoperability and interagency cooperation together. These currents also serve as tools for measuring and analyzing case studies. The first is the commander's environment assessment. This phrase describes the process by which commanders, especially the unified commanders in chiefs (CINCs), come to understand the operational area of

responsibility, its influences, and what aspects of the HA operational environment challenge mission accomplishment. The second current involves translating environmental understanding into organizational structural design. That is, what intellectual, technical, and managerial methodology is necessary when designing an organization to meet the challenges previously identified? Finally, the last current includes those measures the joint force commander deems essential in his quest to enhance unity of effort and interoperability. This is probably the hardest facet of military operations to assess because the commander, the mission, and the environment differ for each operation. Never the less, this tool attempts to illuminate the sine qua non of interagency cooperation.

The monograph is limited to only those operations where U.S. military joint forces participate in foreign humanitarian assistance missions. In addition, the setting places the United States as the predominant participant and where United Nations involvement is uncertain. The study does not address combat or combat related issues. Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations states that United States armed forces support humanitarian assistance operations for varying reasons. First, the disaster is so great that the host's infrastructure is destroyed to the extent that normal base operations are difficult to establish. Second, the disaster location is so remote that only military equipment is suitable to meet the host nation's requirements. Finally, many situations occur where military transportation offers the fastest means by which relief supplies can reach the disaster victims.³ The case studies of Northern Iraq and Rwanda will show how the United States military, coupled with other U.S. governmental agencies,

supported a variety of non-governmental organizations in their endeavor to offer relief to thousands of refugees and disaster victims.

Various governmental, and non-governmental organizations participate in international humanitarian assistance operations. Often, the measure of an operation's success is how well these entities combine their efforts to aid disaster victims. Therefore, as FM 100-23 discusses, commanders who understand the humanitarian assistance environment and its participants must construct systems to support consensus building and unity of effort.⁴ Humanitarian assistance participants include many individuals and organizations who represent numerous causes. For this monograph, HAO participants are grouped into three categories: non-governmental organizations, U.S. governmental agencies, and U.S. military participants. Non-governmental organizations involve themselves, to varying degrees, in all humanitarian assistance operations. Their independence from governmental biases accentuates their opportunities to support people that, for political reasons, governmental agencies cannot. As Dr. David Last notes in his conference report, The Challenge of Interagency Cooperation in International Peace Operations, NGOs are distinguished according to their legal status, functions, resources, operating principles, and expertise.⁵ In addition, most NGOs possess separate headquarters for fund raising and field operations. They respond primarily to the international press and their contributors. An NGO's headquarters operates from its home country for fund raising and reporting to contributors. The field sites consist of case workers whose sole function is to distribute relief, educate the populace, or

construct facilities. These organizations are rarely resourced with an element capable of conducting external coordination.

NGO-governmental cooperation spans a broad spectrum. Some NGOs garner their neutrality to such an extent that any association with government agencies is seen as a violation of their creed. On the other hand, there are NGOs who continually coordinate their operations with governmental agencies. Doctors Without Borders best represents the former and the International Committee of the Red Cross exemplifies the latter. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, prior to any donor-nation involvement, the U.S. joint task force's Special Forces units attempted to support participating non-governmental organizations. Concerns over perceptions of siding with the coalition forces led Doctors Without Borders to ban U.S. support from their refugee camps. Prolonged discussions between the two elements finally resulted in U.S. relief supplies reaching these refugees.⁶

The International Committee of the Red Cross is one NGO that supports humanitarian contingencies world-wide. Its organization, functions, and relations with governments make it unique within the NGO community. As Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations notes, the International Red Cross Movement is further divided into two components with different responsibilities. One component includes the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) that acts to protect victims of armed conflict. The other component includes the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that helps coordinate international relief efforts for disaster victims, displaced persons, and refugees.⁷ The Red Cross Movement does not neatly fit into the NGO or governmental categories.

Both the ICRC and Societies offer a wide variety of assistance to people affected by natural or man-made disasters. Red Cross components often reach the disaster and remain there longer than governmental support operations can afford. Joint Publication 3-08 underscores seven fundamental principles that guide Red Cross operations: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.⁸ These principles allow the organization to transcend political, ethnic, religious and cultural barriers to assist those needing support. Relief efforts include mass care, emergency assistance, and long-term recovery assistance. Due to their well-developed systems for rapid movement and distribution of relief supplies, the Red Cross often assists less capable NGOs to establish operations. Because of its credibility both within the NGO community and governments, the Red Cross bridges the gap between a government's effort to support relief operations and that of non-governmental organizations.

A United States governmental organization that is closely tied to the International Red Cross and that is crucial during humanitarian assistance operations is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). According to the United States Government Manual 1993/1994, the United States Agency for International Development administers U.S. foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.⁹ Within USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for coordinating the U.S. governmental disaster response. OFDA accomplishes this through Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) who deploy and conduct on-site coordination (see

appendix A).¹⁰ OFDA and its DARTs play a key role in coordinating the DOD disaster relief response. The initial recommendations presented by the DART contribute to the joint planner's determination of the joint task force's mission and composition. The Multiservice Procedures Manual for Humanitarian Assistance Operations states that once established in country, the DART is the focal point for the procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.¹¹ The DART carries with it sufficient funds to take the necessary actions to restore/build an infrastructure. DART representatives determine NGO resource shortfalls and distribute funds to NGOs to expedite the flow of relief. Finally, USAID/OFDA/DART representatives coordinate with the other donor governments and the U.S. military (if committed) to solve any operational or political problems.¹² This interagency coordination is the result of strategic guidance developed in National Security Council meetings, and is translated through the Secretaries of Defense and State, as well, as the director of USAID.

U.S. Military participation in HAOs starts with the President and the Secretary of Defense. It is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs who establishes policy and direction of DOD relief activities.¹³ Additionally, he is the primary interagency coordinator in matters of humanitarian affairs. DOD Directive 5100.46 establishes coordination procedures between the DOD and USAID/OFDA for the execution of disaster relief operations.¹⁴ In this process, the regional commander in chief is the central figure responsible for orchestrating the military humanitarian assistance response. He must tailor the organization in a manner that best supports the civilian relief requirements without compromising force

protection. Presently, there are five regionally oriented CINCs whose areas of responsibility are defined by the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The CINC's staff consists of both military and civilian agency representatives who assist in the planning for HAOs. Unless it is an unusually fast-breaking situation, the CINC will deploy an initial disaster assessment team to provide recommendations concerning the level of response required. Joint Publication 3-08 states that the CINC is supported by Special Forces and Civil Affairs teams who deploy to a disaster site as a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).¹⁵ A coordinated HAST/DART assessment reduces the chances of duplication of effort and establishes the military/civilian interface necessary for success. According to Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, the regional CINC usually forms a joint task force as the organization to command and control U.S. military forces within his AOR.¹⁶ During HAOs, the JTF may consist of experts from both civilian and military agencies.

The JTF's composition is dictated by mission requirements. As Joint Publication 3-08 suggests, in every JTF since 1983, success depended on close interagency coordination between U.S. military forces and agencies outside their chain of command.¹⁷ A JTF formed to conduct humanitarian assistance operations normally establishes a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC's purpose is to ensure effective coordination and to provide a forum for cooperation between U.S. armed forces and UN/NGO efforts.¹⁸ When OFDA establishes a DART, the CMOC may locate near it and receive guidance from the OFDA representative. The CMOC is the commander's CA/HAO information center. It provides him with information concerning both JTF and external agency relief operations.

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrated the level of cooperation between the Civil Military Operations Center, OFDA, and participating NGOs. This coordination is necessary to gain the efficient execution of a unified U.S. Governmental response. Appendix B depicts the command and coordination lines of communications between military and civilian agencies during humanitarian assistance operations. The history of U.S. military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations extends into the 18th century. Nevertheless, the issues relating to interagency coordination are a relatively recent phenomenon beginning with the "CORDS" program in Vietnam.

Interagency coordination and unity of effort are the common threads throughout military support for foreign HAOs. The civil-military challenges that characterize today's HAOs began with the United States involvement in Vietnam. The case of Vietnam illustrates a conflict against an established insurgency where both military and civilian efforts attempted to mobilize the populace against the Viet Cong. Andrew Krepinevich, in The Army and Vietnam, states that prior to 1965, the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments attempted pacification programs only to see them fail miserably.¹⁹ The leading cause of these failures was apathy. The U.S. and Government of Vietnam (GVN) militaries discounted the pacification programs. Their role in Vietnam was to fight the main force war and not to participate in governmental pacification efforts. President Johnson provided the solution when he directed Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) to coordinate all civil and military pacification operations. The "new model" pacification program of 1967-1971, known as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was the first major effort to

centrally *command and control* both military and civilian pacification efforts.²⁰ According to Andrew F. Krepinevich, CORDS was the mating of two programs, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.²¹

While the U.S. military had taken over the pacification effort structurally, the U.S. civilians managed both to preserve their own identity and to control the program through aggressive leadership, bureaucratic skill, real and perceived Presidential interest, and a degree of cooperation and tolerance that was remarkable among disparate U.S. policy agencies.²²

The U.S. government's aim during the Vietnamese pacification effort was to draw public support away from the Viet Cong and other North Vietnamese sympathizers.²³ This civilian led pacification effort resulted in the successful coordination of both the U.S. military and governmental agencies. Vietnam ended with a new role and understanding of what interagency coordination meant and what the future held for both military and civilian planners.

U.S. military support to international HAOs increased during the period between the end of the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union's dissolution.²⁴ Tensions between the United States and Soviet Union continued to dictate U.S. foreign policy. This resulted in the U.S. Congress passing the 1985 Stevens Authority act which officially mandated U.S. armed forces support for HAOs.²⁵ According to Robertson's article, this act reinforced an ambassadors' requests for troop deployments to support theater humanitarian needs as a means of maintaining a forward presence against the spread of communism.²⁶ Unfortunately, the United States response was not always properly coordinated. In some cases, relief efforts had little or no effect on the disaster victim. The 1976 Guatemalan earthquake illustrated the early efforts by donor governments to support humanitarian relief

causes. Here, the U.S. military supported an OFDA request by deploying fifteen tons of medical supplies and a U.S. Army field hospital.²⁷ A failure between the U.S. military and USAID to understand the environment and each other's capabilities imputed inharmonious efforts to coordinate the host nation and non-governmental organization (NGO) support requirements. The result was a massive influx of medical supplies and low cost foods that undermined NGO efforts to stabilize the Guatemalan economy and support structure.²⁸

According to FM 100-23, the end of the Cold War established the conditions for greater cooperation within the international community.²⁹ Nations now confront issues such as refugee control, famine, and disaster support without the overshadowing affect of the U.S./U.S.S.R. political brinkmanship. These changes effected the U.S. military in terms of its global dynamics. This, coupled with the new-found authority of the regional CINCs, created a complex environment with new and demanding challenges for all uniformed service members. Simultaneously, donor nations developed support systems to strengthen NGO capabilities. For the present and foreseeable future, the United States' Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) will shoulder much of the responsibility for executing this support. The current systems for interagency coordination highlight the command and control challenges faced by military planners. According to Tom Frey, from USAID, an analysis of both the civilian and military organizations missions in HAOs shows the greatest problem faced is how to standardize the system.³⁰ To do this, planners must search for the best combination of forces, equipment, and C² systems.

DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT

The three currents discussed in the first section are used here to analyze the doctrinal basis for interagency interoperability. The first current is how joint force commanders view their operational environment. This environment constitutes a military system's external and internal conditions. These conditions dictate the amount of information flowing into and out of the system. Organizational structure is the second current discussed. A joint force organization's structure reflects its mission and command and control requirements. The final current involves relating interoperability to the joint force commander's interagency coordination responsibilities during humanitarian assistance operations. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, offers two definitions for interoperability. Of these two definitions, the first better reflects the focus of this monograph,

The Ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services and information to and accept services for information from other systems, units, or forces and to use the exchange services to enable them to operate effectively together.³¹

This examination of interoperability surfaces issues of organizational training, staffing requirements, and new equipment fielding techniques.

As the Army War College reference text, Army Command, Leadership and Management Theory and Practice states, the environment affects all facets of an organization's development. A joint forces operational environment can include physical space, such as Entebbe, Uganda; concepts like a coalition of nations or forces; or a sector such as the military or business environment. The organization is an interdependent element of a larger external environment.³² This environmental area is further subdivided into three functional realms:

internal, task, and general. The internal environment consists of the organization and its components. The task environment consists of forces that directly impact on the organization's mission.³³ These forces within the task environment compete for resources and place requirements on the organization. The general environment is a constant state. That is, those influences included in an organization's general environment are common to all situations and may or may not affect the operation.

Figure 1 illustrates these environmental concepts to U.S. military support for humanitarian assistance operations. The joint task




Figure 1: Humanitarian Assistance Operations Environmental Relationships.

force commander's internal environment includes his staff and subordinate component organizations. The task environment may consist of the host nation, non-governmental and governmental organizations. National and international media, tribal differences, or concerns over past U.S. policy characterize the joint task force's general environment. The primary concern here is the interagency cooperation existing between the military and the organizations that constitute its external environment. A joint task force's success depends on the attainment of unity of effort between itself and a variety of agencies that make up the external environment.

The information flow between the organization and its environment represents the degree of unity between an organization's internal, task, and general environments. Social, technical, and economic changes often result in modifications to existing organizations and the development of new ones. One criteria used in determining organizational design is the amount of information that the system is required to process. Richard Norman in Developing Capabilities for Organizational Learning states that "Organizational strategies" constitute the structural blueprint for change and development.³⁴ His analysis concentrates on how mechanisms contribute to organizational development. Norman advocates that large organizations establish mechanisms to focus on specific tasks to increase a system's agility. In addition, these mechanisms propagate the unit's information processing capability by accomplishing the complicated or critical tasks that the parent organization cannot manage effectively. This reduces the amount of information required to process and increases

productivity. Figure 2 shows the use of organizational mechanisms as components to a joint task force structure.




Figure 2. Humanitarian Assistance Joint Task Force Configuration with Component Mechanisms.

Increasingly, joint task forces perform a variety of tasks outside the realm of combat operations. One method used to confront these non-traditional missions is the formation of subordinate functional or component commands. These components reduce the commander's information and coordination requirements. The formation of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is a recent example of a functional component. According to Colonel Karl Farris of the U.S. Army's Peace Keeping Institute, CMOCs process information relating to the coordination of

military support to HAOs. They accomplish this by providing a forum for participating agencies to voice concerns and request JTF support.³⁵ In both Northern Iraq and Rwanda, CMOCs or similar organizations maintained lines of communications between the host nation, governmental agencies and NGOs. Organizational design alone cannot promote interoperability. It is the joint force commander who ensures that the right mix of people, equipment, and procedures combine to infuse the organization with the necessary environmental and operational knowledge. As illustrated above, the joint task force's design must encourage interoperability among its components and the external environment. New equipment and more sophisticated command and control systems can degrade efforts toward interoperability. As LTG McKnight states in The Principles of Command and Control, "The need for U.S. forces to be able to operate with each other and with our allies has never been greater."³⁶ The U.S. military unified commands are making significant efforts to limit the negative effects on interoperability of these new systems. In European Command (EUCOM), key staff members are organized and trained in measures that will secure at least organizational interoperability if technologic or system interoperability cannot be achieved.³⁷ As Richard Mallion states in Command and Control of Joint Forces: A New Perspective, "What really counts in interoperability are [sic] the forces. It does not matter if some radios or some computer systems interoperate. What does matter is that forces interoperate, but this fact is sometimes lost in the efforts to solve all problems using technical solutions."³⁸ During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (April 1991) in Northern Iraq, Special Forces Teams made up of highly trained soldiers provided the human element that facilitated interoperability

between the JTF and those NGOs supporting the displaced Kurds. These liaison elements represent a tool used to support the commander's information requirements and operational objectives. These teams position themselves with agencies within and outside the parent organization. Their primary purpose is to translate the commander's goals and facilitate the flow of information between organizational boundaries.³⁹

Another method to promote interoperability is to use common equipment. This is as much an interservice problem as it is when working with coalitions. Operation URGENT FURY (October 1983) in Grenada demonstrated the service's inability to operate together effectively. This ultimately led to the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act which strengthened the CINC's influence over service equipment procurement and fielding programs.⁴⁰ The purchase of common item systems resulted from the realization that single service operations were a thing of the past.

In addition, the creation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) is another way staff officers coordinate leadership decisions. SOPs assist the flow of information in two ways. First, they regulate operations. As John P. Crecine and Michael D. Salomone state in Organizational Theory and C³, standard operating procedures allow interior and exterior elements to coordinate with one another purely on the basis of shared expectations.⁴¹ Standard operating procedures increase organizational agility. These procedures form information paths to the commander enabling him to anticipate changes in the strategic setting. The Civil Military Operations Center during Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda established internal standard operating

procedures for coordinating military relief support. The U.N. and NGOs reacted favorably to this standardization for it gave them an understanding of the JTF and its operating systems. This was a difficult task, but ended with the participants better understanding each other's capabilities.

This concept of common standards, especially in the realm of joint task force operations, is now at the forefront of a new plan set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint War Fighting Center, at Ft. Monroe, Va., is developing training and operational standards for joint task forces. These organizational and procedural standards simplify the interface between the U.S. military and coalition partners, governmental agencies and NGOs. In LTG McKnight's essay, he states that "Getting the United States to achieve a common doctrine and common tactical procedures is unlikely given the many countries with which the United States operates."⁴² He then states that the objective is to promote a common understanding of each other's doctrine and procedures among the participants. Given this, Special Forces liaison teams seem to constitute an efficient means for rapidly ensuring interoperability among participants in a crisis HAO situation. The use of U.S. Army Special Forces Teams in Northern Iraq and to a lesser degree in Rwanda proved invaluable to the JTF commander as a means to assess operational requirements and coordinate relief efforts between the U.S. military and UN/NGOs. The benefit these Special Forces bring is an in depth understanding of the operational environment. Through their situational assessment, CINC's staffs can form organizations to meet their interoperability requirements.

CASE STUDY ASSESSMENT

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate contemporary interagency coordination concepts for humanitarian assistance operations. In addition, they highlight the myriad of complex issues facing joint force planners. This section is organized by first discussing the background and setting in which Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE occurred. Second, a picture of the organization's architecture illustrates the internal mechanisms and components established to facilitate the humanitarian assistance operations. Third, an examination of the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the joint forces commanders illustrates the measures that facilitated interagency coordination. In conclusion, a case study comparison highlights the interoperability strengths and shortfalls. This comparison uses the previously discussed criteria of: commander's environmental awareness, organizational design based on that awareness, and did the commander institute procedures to enhance organizational interoperability.

Operation Desert Storm's termination brought a tide of expectations from Islamic minority groups in Southern Iraq and the Kurds in the North.⁴³ On 7 March 1991, the Kurds attacked several Northern Iraqi military installations.⁴⁴ The Iraqi government answered with ground and helicopter gunship attacks. Without coalition support, the Kurds could not defend themselves and retreated into the mountains bordering Turkey. In late March, intelligence sources reported that as many as two thousand Kurds, mostly children, were dying each day.⁴⁵ The Bush administration initially balked at U.S. involvement due to fears of

committing a large regional military presence over a prolonged period of time. It was Secretary of State James Baker's situation report explaining the dire living conditions for the refugees, coupled with intense international and domestic pressure that finally forced President Bush to take action. On 5 April 1991, President Bush ordered the Commander in Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) to commence operations to aid the Kurdish refugees. On 7 April, JTF PROVIDE COMFORT conducted the first air drops of food and blankets.⁴⁶

Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT started from a preexisting organization (JTF PROVEN FORCE, commanded by USAF Major General James Jamerson), whose purpose was to coordinate air strikes against Iraq from the Turkish base in Incirlik. In addition, a Special Forces component, under Brigadier General Richard Potter, conducted combat search and rescue operations.⁴⁷ JTF PROVEN FORCE suited Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's initial support requirements which focused on the planning and execution of aerial supply drops. JTF PROVEN FORCE's Special Forces component, who knew the area, provided invaluable information concerning refugee locations and status. As more countries committed forces, a concern over the operation's duration became apparent. In response, President Bush decided to deploy additional forces, including a robust command and control element. This led to the deployment of Deputy CINC of U.S. Army, Europe, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili and the Deputy V Corps Commander, Major General Garner. According to LTG Shalikashvili's testimony to congress, his mission was to conduct multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations could assume overall supervision.⁴⁸

Upon its arrival at Incirlek, Turkey JTF PROVIDE COMFORT was reorganized into Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT (CTFPC) consisting of two subordinate joint task forces (see appendix C).

CTF PROVIDE COMFORT formed on 17 April under Lieutenant General Shalikashvili's command. Major General Jamerson became the deputy CTF commander, Brigadier General Potter assumed command of JTF Alpha and MG Garner commanded JTF Bravo. In addition to the two JTF commanders, Brigadier General Donald Campbell deployed to establish a Civil Affairs command. JTF Alpha's primary focus was to establish contact with the refugees, provide immediate aid, and convince them to move out of the mountains to either their homes or the camps being established by JTF Bravo.⁴⁹ Additionally, MG Garner possessed combat forces whose mission was to entice and if necessary force the Iraqi Army out of the Kurdish villages, allowing the Kurds to return to their homes. LTG Shalikashvili stated in his testimony to congress that coordination at the operational and tactical level with host nation, governmental agencies and NGOs proved essential.⁵⁰ Key in this effort was the work done by BG Campbell's 353d Civil Affairs Command.

EUCOM planners executed Operation PROVIDE COMFORT without the benefit of a humanitarian assistance plan. Luckily, the reserve Civil Affairs experts from within the host country (Turkey) and other U.S. governmental agencies were already located within the AOR.⁵¹ The CTF's Civil Affairs Command tied together governmental and non-governmental agency operations into a unified effort. Fortunately for LTG Shalikashvili, BG Campbell supported EUCOM for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and was familiar with the area of operations and its major players. In addition, the Civil Affairs units and USAID

representatives who participated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had also operated in Southern Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This affiliation assisted in building a close civil-military relationship. BG Campbell, realizing that success hinged on a smooth transition to civil control, formed an Interagency Coordination Center in Diyarbakir, Turkey (the precursor to the present-day CMOC). The interagency coordination center stood as the interagency cooperative focal point for bi-weekly meetings between the military and representatives of participating NGOs, the UN, UNHCR, and USAID.⁵² Finally, on 5 June 1991, the CTF PROVIDE COMFORT transferred operational control to the UNHCR who assumed overall responsibility for coordinating relief activities in Northern Iraq. Four years later, a similar situation occurred between Rwanda and Zaire, where refugees from a war-torn nation gathered in such numbers that the squalid conditions led to another manmade disaster.

The deaths of the Rwandan and the Burundi Presidents in a mysterious plane crash triggered clashes between rival Hutu and Tutsi tribes. This violence resulted in the dislocation or deaths of over two million people.⁵³ On 28 April 1994, the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, declared a state of disaster.⁵⁴ USAID immediately deployed Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to Kigali, Rwanda; Entebbe, Uganda and Zaire. By far the worst situation outside Rwanda was at Goma, Zaire.⁵⁵ Two thousand people were dying each day from cholera and other related diseases. On 18 July, after meeting with Mr. Brian Atwood (USAID Administrator), President Clinton approved the deployment of U.S. troops to eastern Zaire to provide logistical support for delivery and distribution of desperately needed emergency relief supplies.⁵⁶ USCINCEUR established Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE on 22

July and simultaneously began planning, organizing and deploying critical assets in theater.

The Commander in Chief for European Command (CINCEUCOM), General George Jouwan, established Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE to provide assistance for the humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations in Zaire and Rwanda.⁵⁷ Initially, the JTF consisted of a forward element at Entebbe under the command of Brigadier General Jack Nix (Southern European Task Force Commander) while the remainder of the JTF staff worked from Stuttgart, Germany. On 25 July 1994, LTG Daniel Schroeder, Deputy Commander U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) assumed command of JTF SUPPORT HOPE, and BG Nix became the Deputy JTF Commander. Upon notification, BG Nix reported to EUCOM headquarters where the CINC gave his initial guidance that "we are in Rwanda for humanitarian reasons, not for peacekeeping or combat operations. The troops must understand their role."⁵⁸ This guidance is key, for it established the conditions for military operations. Additionally, it placed limitations on the use of force by the JTF staff. As supplies and equipment began to flow into Zaire, BG Nix deployed to Entebbe to link-up with Colonel Alan Davis.⁵⁹ By the first week in August, the JTF had deployed its major components consisting of the main command post at Entebbe, Uganda; JTF-Alpha at Goma, Zaire; JTF-Bravo located in Kigali, and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and the JFACC located at Entebbe (see appendix D). BG Nix, now in command of JTF Alpha at Goma, Zaire, directed the flow of supplies and the establishment of water purification facilities. JTF Bravo opened Kigali airfield and conducted the initial coordination with the United Nations' agencies. The JTF staff officers assigned to the CMOC coordinated directly with the USAID,

the UN agencies, and NGOs to deconflict requests for military assets and facilitate communications between the participants. The JTF's main command post included a CMOC to initiate the interagency coordination effort. As the operation progressed, a second CMOC at Kigali opened to further facilitate coordination between the JTF and United Nations.

By 3 August, operations at Goma began to stabilize. The potable water facilities were operating and the refugee death rate dropped from two thousand to two hundred a day.⁶⁰ On 19 August, LTG Schroeder refocused his operations toward Kigali signaling the JTF's shift in emphasis to the UN agencies and NGOs. Kigali became the operation's focal point. Located in Kigali was the United Nations center for relief coordination. According to Colonel Karl Farris, this center, referred to as the On-Site Operations Coordinating Center (OSOCC), was formed by United Nation's Rwanda Emergency Office to concentrate the UN's relief operations. The OSOCC included representatives from each UN agency, most NGOs, USAID, and the Kigali CMOC.⁶¹ Until the operation's completion, the UN's OSOCC remained the focal point for interagency coordination.

Case Study Analysis

Was the Commander's Strategic and Operational Assessment Based on Environmental Awareness?

Both PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate the need for clear command guidance in rapid response situations. In this environment, strategic and operational level leadership provides the JTF commander with a consistent view of what he wants accomplished (end state). The President, CINCEUCOM, and the JTF Commander's initial guidance to forces supporting Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was to establish

the conditions for ultimate turnover of humanitarian relief operations to the United Nations and relief organizations. The CTF's subordinate and adjacent components understood the concept of operations and end state. As both the UN and CTF organizations grew, both focused on the eventual transition of responsibility. This resulted in the understanding that the entire apparatus would eventually be turned over to civil control. This mutual understanding supported organizational consensus building and unity of effort.

Conversely, Operation SUPPORT HOPE's initial commander's guidance was, as articulated in JTF SUPPORT HOPE OPORD 94-001, "to establish liaison with relief agencies currently working in the crisis area, stop the loss of life due to disease, repatriate refugees, and work with humanitarian organizations to bring a solution to the problem."⁶² This guidance illustrates the U.S. military's ignorance of HAOs and the role of the U.N. and NGOs. The CINC wanted to solve the problem via military means vice supporting the NGOs and U.N. agencies. It was not until after BG Nix's assessment, that the CINC reevaluated the mission and end state requirements.

The initial confusion over Operation SUPPORT HOPE's mission requirements caused misunderstandings between the CINC's staff and the JTF. On the ground BG Nix was, in effect, supporting the UN and NGO efforts to build a sustainable infrastructure at Goma. The CINC and JTF staffs remained in Germany and continued to plan according to the initial guidance. The result, was a gap between the planning efforts and what was actually executed by the JTF Forward.⁶³ The confused situation within the JTF translated to the UN and NGOs not fully understanding what the US wanted to accomplish. Two events solved this

problem: the deployment of a sophisticated communications package that enabled BG Nix to rapidly pass information back to the headquarters in Stuttgart and the JTF commander's arrival at Entebbe which gave him a better appreciation for the operational environment.

Was the Organization's Structure Tailored to the Mission and Environmental requirements?

JTF PROVEN FORCE gave CTF PROVIDE COMFORT the luxury of an established headquarters in theater.⁶⁴ Although not equipped or staffed to conduct HAOs, JTF PROVEN FORCE demonstrated agility in quickly reacting to the 5 April NCA directive.⁶⁵ JTF PROVEN FORCE increased the organizational interoperability, where by preexisting command and control links afforded the JTF commander the opportunity to focus on the mission rather than normal infrastructure issues. In addition, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT had experienced staff officers who were qualified in critical humanitarian assistance fields. The experiences in Kuwait and Southern Iraq afforded the civil affairs units a better understanding of the environment. According to Dr. John T. Fishel in Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, their expertise in HAOs and familiarity with other participating USG agencies assisted the CTF's consensus building effort.⁶⁶

JTF SUPPORT HOPE also relied on split-based command and control during the early assessment and deployment stages. The JTF main command post operated from Stuttgart, Germany while the JTF forward under BG Nix's control was located at Entebbe.⁶⁷ Unlike PROVIDE COMFORT, weak ties existed between the JTF Forward and the Main command posts. This resulted in communications delays between the JTF's rear and forward command posts which further exacerbated the problems the JTF staff

experienced as it tried to keep pace with the tempo of execution.⁶⁸ The JTF planning staff was unaware of coordination between the JTF Forward and the UN/NGOs at Entebbe. Once LTG Schroeder established the main command post at Entebbe, the communications problems subsided and the JTF assumed full operational control.

JTF SUPPORT HOPE experienced equipment and personnel problems associated with establishing an ad hoc organization. Initially, very few secure phone and facsimile lines existed at the JTF headquarters. Automation equipment presented another problem. Members of the JTF staff brought their own computers which resulted in software standardization problems.⁶⁹ The lack of joint and staff training hindered the JTF's formation. Many members of the staff had never worked together and most performed functions for which they had received little or no preparatory training.⁷⁰ Delays occurred as officers received preparatory training in JTF formation and deployment procedures.

Many HAO experts deployed from the United States.⁷¹ These experts required time-consuming updates to inform them on the current situation. In addition, this created delays as these officers familiarized themselves with the area and organizations involved. Once incorporated into the JTF organization, the civil affairs experts expanded the CMOC operations from Entebbe to Kigali where they collocated their operations center with the U.N.'s OSOCC. This significantly enhanced the military to military and military to civilian coordination as the JTF began to disengage in October 1994.

What Interagency-Interoperability Coordination Measures Were Instituted?

By the operation's end, both PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE constituted success stories concerning the organization's coordination with the UN, NGOs, and OFDA/DART. This was not true during the initial stages. Two factors contributed to the problems experienced. First, leaders and planners were unfamiliar with NGO operations. This initially hindered coordination efforts.⁷² Second, the planners, unable to foresee interagency requirements, did not deploy the Civil Affairs units into the area of operations early enough to establish liaison with the civilian agencies already supporting the crisis. This lack of understanding by U.S. military leaders reinforced the stereotypical images NGOs had of military operations. Another point emphasized by the CALL AARs was that Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's military planners experienced difficulty understanding the loosely organized NGOs and the significance of political and economic factors on NGO operations.⁷³ Again, the factor that led to the CTF's success in Northern Iraq was the presence of qualified experts in the field of interagency coordination and humanitarian assistance. From the beginning, BG Campbell and his civil affairs staff trained the CTF planners. This resulted in fewer mistakes and closer ties with the U.N. in Geneva.⁷⁴

JTF SUPPORT HOPE experienced similar problems early in the operation. The mission of JTF SUPPORT HOPE was to coordinate with and support UNHCR and the NGOs. Coordination between the JTF and relief agencies did not come to fruition until BG Nix arrived in Goma.⁷⁵ Compounding this problem was the delay in establishing a fully functional CMOC. Once established, the Civil Military Operations Center became the epitome of interagency coordination.

EMERGING HAO TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

This section looks at the lessons learned from past HAOs and discusses some present-day solutions for improving the current system. As LTC Robert Reese, a J5 planner in JTF SUPPORT HOPE, witnessed during Operation SUPPORT HOPE, crisis action planning and crisis response situations often result in weak initial decisions which we either live with or must make-up for during the operation.⁷⁶ In the 1992 National Military Strategy, for the first time the JCS recognized humanitarian assistance as an essential operational means to accomplish a strategic end.⁷⁷ Reflecting on the case studies, the three currents are again seen as areas that exist where crucial early stage decisions can significantly impact on an organizations ability to accomplish its mission. These currents form the frame-work for discussing initiatives in which joint force commanders assess their environment, form the organization, and dictate the procedures that best meet their interoperability requirements.

Throughout this study, the unified commander's initial assessment has been touted as the sine qua non for all subsequent decisions. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important for joint staffs to possess a means by which they interact with the participants inside their AOR. One technique currently used by the unified commands is the formation of deployable joint task forces (DJTF) that operate as a permanent entity within the CINC's staff. The formation of a DJTF gives the unified commander the benefit of a permanent organization, staffed with experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, who can deploy within hours to support any crisis situation. DJTFs differ from permanent JTFs, in that, they are primarily planning cells without a

pre-identified commander and no subordinate service components. DJTFs currently operate in USACOM and PACOM. The organization is usually a joint staff directorate on the CINC staff. The DJTF provides responsive joint staff expertise in Crisis Action Planning (CAP) during training exercises and actual operations. DJTFs augment the JTF headquarters with officers and non-commissioned officers who make the staff joint.⁷⁸ By staffing the DJTF with trained Civil Affairs personnel, the joint task force commander shortens his organizational interagency learning curve. These specially trained officers and non-commissioned officers coordinate with United Nations, U.S. governmental agencies, and NGOs operating within the CINC's AOR.

The advantage of a DJTF is that it is a cost effective way for the CINC to ensure operational standardization within the joint task force. Unable to afford a permanent joint task force, the CINC deploys this trained cell of joint experts to augment the organization and support the flow of information within the joint task force headquarters and between the organization and its environment. The second advantage to the DJTF is its adaptability. It can be tailored to meet mission requirements. Therefore, in the case of a humanitarian assistance operation, the DJTF deploys with Civil Affairs and logistics experts who understand the characteristics of the agencies involved. The primary disadvantage to the formation of a Deployable Joint Task Force is keeping qualified personnel. Maintaining a trained and experienced team of officers and non-commissioned officers is difficult in an era of reduced manning. As was shown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT with JTF PROVEN FORCE, a small preestablished group of area specialists present an efficient (time, manpower, and equipment) means for unified

commanders to derive there initial assessment and as a base organization for the joint task force.

The CINC's decision concerning the actual joint task force structure is often dictated by precedence and the operational environment. Unified commanders may form joint task forces in three ways; by combining individuals to form an ad hoc organization, by using a service component headquarters, or by developing deployable joint task force from the regional CINC's staff. The normal U.S. response to disaster relief is the formation of an ad hoc joint task force. Operation SUPPORT HOPE illustrates an ad hoc JTF organization. The leitmotiv characteristic of ad hoc JTFs is functional necessity. That is, the organization is formed from its staff through components of only those elements essential for mission accomplishment. Moreover, parent organizations may be split if the whole element is not needed to form a smaller more focused component. The unified commander usually selects the JTF commander from his staff or a subordinate component command. EUCOM uses what they call a component basis means for forming JTFs.⁷⁹ EUCOM's techniques are the closest means studied to standardizing an ad hoc JTF formation methodology. Central to their system is the JTF planning cell. This is a crisis response cell formed upon notification and includes representation from all the components. When the execute order arrives, the JTF planning cell forms the nucleus staff for the JTF.

In addition to ad hoc organizations, CINCs also may choose to employ single service organizations or permanent joint task forces. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT illustrates the advantages of a single service task force in response to limited missions. Here a predominately Air

Force organization known as JTF PROVEN FORCE executed the initial drops of relief supplies on 5 April 1991. This organization satisfactorily supported the initial requirements established by the President and the CINC. The primary drawback of a single service JTF is the participants' lack of joint experience and awareness of sister service resources. Once Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's scope grew, it became necessary to expand the headquarters to provide the proper level of command and control, as well as joint and combined force representation. If the JTF headquarters does not represent the force structure, difficulties arise as a result of the lack of the interservice experience that a fully integrated staff possesses.⁸⁰ The result is that the lack of staff representation forces components to augment the JTF staff.

The advantages to a predominately single service joint task force are in reaction time and interoperability. Again, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, JTF PROVEN FORCE's structure complemented the initial mission. The organization was trained in and equipped for the initial air drop of relief supplies. Additionally, JTF PROVEN FORCE established, through Air Force channels, the procedures necessary to expedite the movement and reception of relief supplies.

The third option open to the CINC is to form a permanent joint task force. This option gives the CINC an in-house organization to draw upon. Additionally, the organization may be tailored to meet the specific mission requirements. The greatest advantage is that this type of joint task force is a fully integrated staff versed in joint operations and CINC specific standard operating procedures. A permanent JTF provides the CINC with an organization capable of rapid deployment and requires little or no augmentation or training. The disadvantage to

a permanent JTF is cost. The CINCs are not normally resourced to establish permanent joint task forces. An organization of this nature, in today's environment of fiscal austerity, would come out of hide. Another disadvantage is unless the CINC can justify its existence, a permanent humanitarian assistance task force may not be feasible. As a result, the formation of permanent JTFs depends on requirements for its services and resources available. It is unclear whether or not CINCs would prefer this method over an ad hoc or service predominant organization.

The final area where decisions at the unified command level can better prepare forces for the joint and interagency environment involves joint force training and interagency awareness. This awareness relates to the joint task force staff's experience and training level. As Joint Publication 3-08 states, the responsibility for joint training lies with the regional commander in chief.⁸¹ Every military planner on a CINC's staff must understand the requirements and possess the tools to ensure complete interservice, interagency, and country-specific coordination.⁸² Rarely are JTF staff officers and non-commissioned officers trained to operate in the joint and combined setting. A train-up period is often required to educate JTF staff members on standard operating and reporting procedures.⁸³ Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated a lack of organizational and training skills by the JTF staffs to support HAOs. In both cases, the joint task force commander initially had neither the structure nor the qualified people to coordinate military, U.N., and NGO operations. Trial and error finally led the JTF to acquire the combination of facilities and expertise needed for interagency coordination.

The CINCs and JCS are currently examining several methods that will better prepare joint task forces for joint, combined and interagency operations. One method involves a training option available to all CINCs. In September 1994, the JCS Joint Doctrine Center and the Joint Warfare Center combined to form the Joint Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe Virginia. The Joint Warfighting Center supports CINC directed exercises by training joint staffs in the areas of interagency coordination and joint operations. These exercises allow the CINC to refine the joint task force structure. This saves valuable time that is often wasted during an operation's initial stages. With a limited number of qualified civil affairs experts and increased requests for their services, the Joint Warfighting Center training gives the CINCs an organic means to support their civil affairs assessments. These officers and non-commissioned officers are then better prepared to make initial recommendations concerning the operation's scope, environment, and mission requirements. There are really no disadvantages to this method of training CINC and JTF staffs. The greatest asset the JWC provides the CINC involves time and location. During these exercises, the CINC assembles all the players that would normally be involved in an operation. This is an excellent opportunity for the development and refinement of standard operating procedures. Additionally, as exercises progress, the organizations become better prepared to execute contingency operations.

CONCLUSIONS

As discussed throughout this study, the critical areas in which the U.S. military interagency coordination effort focuses during humanitarian assistance operations are environmental awareness, organizational design, and development of measures that enhance interagency coordination. Included in his understanding of his environment, the joint force commander must possess a keen awareness of the players and their motivations. Commanders must realize that the component central to all NGO operations is maintenance of their neutrality. Donor governments will not receive NGO support if they display impartiality only when it is politically convenient. That is, a policy of impartiality is a standard, and when that standard is broken it is difficult to regain credibility. Commanders must realize that NGOs become vulnerable to reprisals once donor governments side with one element in a conflict. As Stephen Green wrote in International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System, donor governments are now more than ever willing to dedicate resources earlier earmarked for deterrence to support humanitarian efforts.⁸⁴ Therefore, it behooves NGOs to increase their efficiency and organization. With that, NGOs can become full partners in future multinational operations. NGOs are not the only element within the joint force commander's HAO environment. He must also account for the litany of U.S. and host nation governmental agencies. The United States Agency for International Development provides the joint force commander with a single reference point with whom he can coordinate his actions. This is fundamental when joint staffs, in a time sensitive situation, attempt to build an organization that best reflects the operational environment. The relationship built

between the CINC's assessment team and USAID's DART reduces the confusion and chaos normally associated with disaster relief operations.

From his environmental awareness, the joint force commander and staff form the organization that provides the military HAO support. To respond to its environmental tasking requirements, the organizational design must include mechanisms or components which best suit the requirements to interface with the organization's environment. Most foreign disasters inherently require a joint military organization. Therefore, components may include service representation, Special Operations forces, as well as U.S. Civil agency representation. As was seen during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, having an established organization to build upon greatly reduces the time and resource requirements needed to get the relief flowing. What was not available during the early stages of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, and which is usually the last asset to deploy, were the Civil Affairs experts who establish the Civil Military Operations Center. The principal lesson learned from both Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE was that the early deployment and establishment of a functional CMOC significantly assists in coordination and transition efforts between the joint task force and its environment.

Although organizational design plays a critical role in how well a joint force accomplishes its humanitarian assistance mission, it is the training and procedures established by the joint force commander that truly account for promoting interoperability. As seen in the doctrinal analysis and both case studies, joint force commanders employed differing methods to foster interoperability. One technique discussed involved the use of liaison teams. The use of Special forces


teams to liaison between the CTF, the NGOs, and the Kurdish refugees proved invaluable as LTG Shalikashvili, through BG Campbell and MG Garner, establish camps and moved the refugees away from the mountains. Another method employed by joint force commanders to promote interoperability is common communications equipment. We saw during the early stages of Operation SUPPORT HOPE problems arise between BG Nix's forward operations and the planning effort in Stuttgart. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT exemplified the benefits of rapid deployment and infusion of an organization into its area of operations. The availability of JTF PROVEN FORCE assets meant a relatively easy transition from its DESERT STORM search and rescue mission to that of locating refugees and distributing relief supplies. The last procedure used by joint commanders to increase interoperability involves the development of standard operating procedures. By standardizing operational procedures, the joint force commanders reduce the confusion and chaos normally associated with emergency deployment humanitarian assistance operations. The effect of standardizing one's procedures was seen during Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Once the CMOC published the procedure for receiving and processing external support requests, both the military personnel and NGOs possessed a better understanding of the JTF's mission and what the organization was and was not capable of accomplishing.

The Department of Defense is changing its attitude toward humanitarian assistance interagency coordination. Doctrine for the use of HACCs and CMOCs within the CINCs and JTFs respectively, will facilitate a better understanding of the operational environment and offer the external agencies a means to translate their requirements. At


the same time, security barriers to effective interagency coordination are weakening, thus improving consensus and unity of effort. By developing training programs, such as those currently being conducted with the U.S. NGO coalition InterAction, the Army is training U.S. NGOs and its forces collectively during routine exercises. The American Council for Voluntary International Action, better known as InterAction, is one of the United States's leading advocates for humanitarian aid to the world's developing countries.⁸⁵ This training between joint military forces, governmental agencies and NGOs provides an understanding of each others' capabilities and limitations and reduces the misunderstandings that often occur during actual HAOs.

Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations force commanders into non-standard environments which result in adjustments to proven methods of command and control.⁸⁶ The humanitarian assistance environmental considerations define the military organization, its manner of communication and its relationship with governmental and non-governmental partners. Thus, joint force commanders must be capable of rapidly developing an operational concept and the guidance leading to organizational development. They can only satisfy the organization's structural needs if they understands this environment. The joint task force organization must retain the greatest amount of flexibility possible. The situation will change and the organization must be capable of adjusting to meet new challenges. This requirement necessitates the development of information systems, which assess the situation and provide immediate feedback to commanders and staffs.


Appendix A: USAID/OFDA Organization and coordination architecture.




Appendix B: Command and coordination lines of communications between military and civilian agencies during humanitarian assistance operations.



Appendix C: Combined Task Force Provide Comfort Organizational Design.



Appendix D: Joint Task Force Support Hope Organizational Design.



Endnotes

¹Brian Robertson, "Can the World Find Aid in the Private Sector" Insight on the News, December 1994, 6.

²William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 9.

³Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), 50, 51, 52.

⁴Ibid., 43.

⁵David M. Last, Ph.D., MAJ RCA, The Challenge of Interagency Cooperation in International Peace Operations: A Conference Report (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), 5.

⁶Gordon W. Rudd, LTC, USA, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 1991), 11.

⁷Draft Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), B-3-3.

⁸Ibid., B-3-2.

⁹Martha L. Girard and Trudy H. Peterson, The United States Government Manual 1993/1994 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 286.

¹⁰Air Land Sea Application Center, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance, Final Draft (Washington D.C.: JCS, 1994), G-2.

¹¹Ibid., F-1.

¹²Ibid., F-1.

¹³JP 3-08, II-29.

¹⁴Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance, 3-6.

¹⁵JP 3-08, IV-13.

¹⁶Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), II-6.

¹⁷JP 3-08, I-7.

¹⁸Karl Farris, COL, USA, Civil Military Operations Center (Carlisle Barracks, PA: AWCPI, 1994), 1.

¹⁹Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 219.

²⁰R. W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1973), 114.

²¹Krepinevich, 217.

²²Thomas W. Scoville, United States Organization and Management for Pacification, Advice and Support in South Vietnam, 1954-1968: Bureaucratic Politics and Presidential Power (Draft of Ph.D. Diss., 1975), 2.

²³Ibid., 110.

²⁴Ernest L. Sutton, COL, U.S. Army, The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make it Work (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 13.

²⁵William J. Marshall III, CDR USN, By Separate Action: Humanitarian Assistance (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1993), 3.

²⁶Brian Robertson, "Can the World Find Aid in the Private Sector?" Insight on the News, December 1994, 6.

²⁷Ibid., 14.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹FM 100-23, 24.

³⁰Tom Frey, USAID, Presentation on interagency coordination and training at the International Peace Operations Conference, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994.

³¹Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994).

³²Army Command, Leadership and Management Theory and Practice, A Reference Text (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1992-1993), 3-6.

³³Ibid., 3-7.

³⁴Richard Normann, "Developing Capabilities for Organizational Learning," in Organizational Strategy and Change, ed. Johannes M. Pennings and Associates (London: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1985), 220.

³⁵Karl Farris, Colonel USA, Civil Military Operations Center (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: United States Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, 1994), 1.

³⁶C.E. McKnight, Jr., "Solving the Interoperability Problem," in Principles of Command and Control, ed. Jon L. Boyes and Stephen J. Andriole (Washington, D.C.: AFCEA International Press, 1987), 382.

³⁷Richard Mallion, "Interoperability: Theory and Practice in JTC³A," in Control of Joint Forces, ed. LTG Clarence E. McKnight, USA Ret. (Fairfax, Va: AFCEA International Press, 1989), 231.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Gordon W. Rudd, Operation Provide Comfort (West Point: United States Military Academy, 1991), 3.

⁴⁰Jerry O. Tuttle, "CINC's Impact on C³ Systems Planning and Acquisition," in Control of Joint Forces, ed. LTG Clarence E. McKnight, USA Ret. (Fairfax, Va: AFCEA International Press, 1989), 117.

⁴¹John P. Crecine and Michael D. Salomone, "Organization Theory and C³," in Science of Command and Control: Part II, ed. Stuart E. Johnson and Alexander H. Levis (Fairfax, Va: AFCEA International Press, 1989), 48.

⁴²C.E. McKnight, 386.

³⁶LTC Gordon W. Rudd, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile on the Mosaic, 6 April-15 July 1991 (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), 5.

⁴⁴LTG John M. Shalikashvili, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Testimony," 4 Sep 91, to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: Preventing Chaos in the Former Soviet Union, The Debate on Providing Aid (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 Jan 92), 1.

⁴⁵Rudd, 1.

⁴⁶CMDR William J. Marshall III. USN, By Separate Action: Humanitarian Assistance (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1993), 8.

⁴⁷Combat Search and Rescue Operations or CSAR are often conducted as joint Air Force/Army operations with the purpose of locating and extracting pilots shot down over enemy territory. In many cases, the Army will use Special Forces units to support the Air Force in the execution of this operation.

⁴⁸Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT Command Briefing, 1991, 7, located in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Operation PROVIDE COMFORT archival records.

⁴⁹Ibid., 20.

⁵⁰Ibid., 22.

⁵¹Marshall, 16.

⁴⁵BG Donald F. Campbell, USAR, Commander 353d CA Command, In a Memorandum to LTG Shalikashvili Concerning the Status of CTF Operations with PVO/IO/NGOs, 10 May 91, 2, located in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Operation PROVIDE COMFORT archival records.

⁵³Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Daily Report on the Rwanda Emergency, 27 July 1994, 1, located in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Operation SUPPORT HOPE archival records.

⁵⁴Ibid., 7.

⁵⁵Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE, Commander's Operational Summary Number 1, 3 August 1994, 1, located in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Operation SUPPORT HOPE archival records.

⁵⁶OFDA Daily Report, 2.

⁵⁷Message from CINCEUCOM to CINCUSAREUR establishing JTF SUPPORT HOPE's mission and providing the CINC's initial concept of operations, 27 July 1994, 1, located in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Operation SUPPORT HOPE archival records.

⁵⁸Ibid., 4.

⁵⁹Colonel Alan Davis headed the Special Operations Command, Europe's Advance Team which deployed to Goma, Zaire on 20 July 1995.

⁶⁰CJTF UPDATE #1, 1.

⁶¹COL Karl Farris, Report to the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned on Operation SUPPORT HOPE Civil Military Operations Center (U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 29 November 1994), 4.

⁶²Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE Operations Order 94-001, 4.

⁶³LTC Adams trip report from his deployment with the Battle Command Training Program's Operations Group Delta in Support of JTF SUPPORT HOPE, 6.

⁶⁴Rudd, 3.

⁶⁵Marshall, 8.

⁶⁶John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 58.

⁶⁷U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned JTF SUPPORT HOPE, 10.

⁶⁸Operation SUPPORT HOPE J5, Operation SUPPORT HOPE Summary, 1 August 1994, 1.

⁶⁹Interview with LTC Robert Reese, School for Advanced Military Studies Fellow who supported the Battle Command Training Team's JTF SUPPORT HOPE operations, 18 Oct 1994.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, 5.

⁷²Ibid., 24.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid., 13

⁷⁵Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE Summary of Key Observations, undated, 4.

⁷⁶After action comments and papers by LTC Robert Reese, AOAS fellow assigned to Operation SUPPORT HOPE, 1995.

⁷⁷Ernest L. Sutton, COL, U.S. Army, The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make it Work (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 1.

⁷⁸CINCUSACOM Deployable Joint Task Force 140 Standard Operating Procedures.

⁷⁹Headquarters United States European Command, Joint Task Force Staff Officer's Brain Book (April 1993), 6.

⁸⁰As a joint task force command and control observer/controller while assigned with the Battle Command Training Program, the author witnessed the formation of joint task forces from all five regional CINCs. These JTFs varied in complexion from ad hoc organizations to predominately single service command and control structures. JTF headquarters that were predominantly single service experienced difficulties coordinating sister service operations. Usually this type of structure requires a significant amount of liaison between the component and JTF headquarters.

⁸¹Joint Publication 3-0, II-13.

⁸²Sutton, 5.

⁸³U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT After Action Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 1994), 5.

⁸⁴Stephen Green, International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 30.

⁸⁵JP 3-08, B-2-1.

⁸⁶The environment refers to the external influences that impact on JTF humanitarian assistance operations. These influences are the organizations, agencies, governments, and other elements that the joint force commander must take into consideration when structuring his organization.

Bibliography

Books and Periodicals

- Allard, Kenneth C. Command, Control, and the Common Defense. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Awoonor, Kofi N. "The Concerns of Recipient Nations." In A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters, ed. Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. Washington, D.C.: A Joint Publication of BasicBooks and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
- Carrington, James H. Ph.D. Command Control Compromise: Values and Objectives for the Military Manager. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
- Coakely, Thomas P. Command and Control for War and Peace. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992.
- Coate, Roger A., ed. "Increasing the Effectiveness of the UN System." U.S. Policy and the Future of the United Nations. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994.
- Crecine, John P. and Salomone, Michael D. "Organization Theory and C³." In Science of Command and Control: Part II, ed. Stuart E. Johnson and Alexander H. Levis. Fairfax: AFCEA International Press, 1989.
- Cushman, John H. Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy. Cambridge: AFCEA International Press, 1985.
- DePuy, William E. "Concepts of Operation: The Heart of Command, The Tool of Doctrine." In Control of Joint Forces, ed. LTG Clarence E. McKnight, USA, Ret. Fairfax: AFCEA International Press, 1989.
- Eliasson, Jan "The World Response to Humanitarian Emergencies." In A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disaster, ed. Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. Washington, D.C.: A Joint Publication of BasicBooks and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
- Fishel, John T. Ph.D. Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, 1992.
- Galbraith, Jay R. "Organization Design: An Information Processing View." In Readings in Organizational Behavior and Performance, ed. Andrew D. Szilagyi, Jr. and Marc J. Wallace, Jr. Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1980.
- Green, Stephen. International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
- Komer, R.W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam. Santa Monica: RAND, 1973.

- Leonard, James F. "U.S. Policy Toward the United Nations." In U.S. Policy and the Future of the United Nations. ed. Roger A. Coate. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994.
- Mallion, Richard. "Interoperability: Theory and Practice in JTC'A." In Control of Joint Forces, ed. LTG Clarence E. McKnight, USA Ret. Fairfax: AFCEA International Press, 1989.
- McKnight, C.E. Jr. "Solving the Interoperability problem." In Principles of Command and Control, ed. Jon L. Boyes and Stephen J. Andriole. Washington, D.C.: AFCEA International Press, 1987.
- Miller, Paul D., Admiral, USN. The Interagency Process. Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993.
- Minear, Larry. "Making the Humanitarian System Work Better." A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters. ed. Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. Washington, D.C.: A Joint Publication of BasicBooks and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
- Normann, Richard. "Developing Capabilities for Organizational Learning." In Organizational Strategy and Change, ed. Johannes M. Pennings and Associates. London: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1985.
- Pennings, Johannes M. and Associates. Organizational Strategy and Change. London: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1985.
- Robertson, Brian. "Can the World Find Aid in the Private Sector?" Insight on the News. December 1994.
- Tuttle, Jerry O. "CINC's Impact on C³ Systems Planning and Acquisition." In Control of Joint Forces, ed. LTG Clarence E. McKnight, USA Ret. Fairfax: AFCEA International Press, 1989.
- Zeiner-Gundersen, H.F. "Reflections by a Soldier on Command, Control and Leadership." In Principles of Command and Control, ed. Jon L. Boues and Stephen J. Andriole. Washington, D.C.: AFCEA International Press, 1987.

Official Publications

- Air Land Sea Application Center. Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Final Draft, 1994.
- Army Command, Leadership and Management: Theory and Practice, A Reference Text. Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 1992-1993.
- Center For Army Lessons Learned. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1993.
- Center for Army Lessons Learned. Newsletter No. 92-6. Operations Other Than War Volume I Humanitarian Assistance. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1992.

Center for Army Lessons Learned Draft Initial Impressions Report(IIR). French and British Peace Operations, Lessons Learned. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1994.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operation Provide Promise. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1994.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Special Edition Somalia Handbook. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1993.

Center For Army Lessons Learned. Summary of Key Observations, Operation Support Hope. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1994.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT After Action Report. Fort Leavenworth: USACAC, 1994.

Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1994.

Department of Defense. Operation Support Hope Handbook. 1994.

Department of Defense, Joint Warfighting Center. Command Briefing Slides. Fort Monroe: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995.

Field Manual 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Baltimore: United States Government Printing Office, 1990.

General Accounting Office Washington DC National Security and International Affairs Division. Defense Inventory: DoD's Humanitarian Assistance Program, 1991.

Girard, Martha L. and Peterson, Trudy H. The United States Government Manual 1993/1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Joint Publication 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993.

Joint Publication 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986.

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993.

Joint Publication 3-08, Draft, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiers of Staff, 1994.

Joint Publication 3-56. Tactical Command and Control Planning Vol I. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993.

Joint Test Publication 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991.

Joint Publication 5-00.2. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992.

Joint Publication 6-0. Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992.

Office of foreign Disaster Assistance. Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response. Bureau for Humanitarian Response, U.S. Agency for International Development, 1994.

Presidential Decision Directive 25. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. May 1994.

The United Nations Department of Public Information. Everyone's United Nations. New York: Department of Public Information, 1986.

USCINUSACOM. Deployable Joint Task Force 140 Standard Operating Procedures, 1994.

Unpublished Dissertations, Thesis, and Papers

Aspin, Les. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Statement Concerning Operation Provide Comfort, 1991.

Campbell, Donald F. BG, USAR. Commander 353 CA Command. In a Memorandum to LTG Shalikashvili Concerning the Status of CTF Operations with PVO/IO/NGOs, 10 May 91.

Cavanaugh, John P. LTC, USA. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: A Model for Future NATO Operations. Fort Leavenworth: United States Army School for Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 1992.

Commander, JTF Support Hope. Operation Support Hope Summary. 1 August 1994.

Farris, Karl COL, USA. Civil Military Operations Center. Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, 1994.

Joint Task Force Support Hope. Draft Refugee Crisis Campaign Plan 94-001, 27 July 1994.

Joint Task Force Support Hope. Draft Joint Task Force Support Hope Operational Concept, 26 July 1994.

JTF Support Hope. OPLAN 94-002. 28 July 1994.

Last, David M. Ph.D., MAJ RCAF. The Challenge of Interagency Cooperation in International Peace Operations: A Conference Report. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994.

Marshall, William J. III. By Separate Action: Humanitarian Assistance. New Port: Naval War College, 1992.

Pelletiere, Stephen C., Ph.d. Humanitarian Operations and the Middle East: The Hostility Factor. Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 1993.

Reese, Robert. LTC, USA. SAMS Observer with JTF Support Hope General Observations, 1994

Rudd, Gordon W. LTC. USA. Operation Proved Comfort. West Point: USMA, 1991.

Rudd, Gordon W. LTC., USA. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile on the Mosaic, 6 April-15 July 1991. Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991.

Schroeder, Daniel R. After action briefing slides presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 October 1994.

Shalikashvili, John M. LTG, USA. Commander Operation Provide Comfort. Operation Provide Comfort Command Briefing Slides. Presented to the Defense Policy Panel, 4 September 1991.

Shalikashvili, John M. LTG, USA. 4 September 1991 Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Testimony to the Committee on Armed Services. House of Representatives. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: Preventing Chaos in the Former Soviet Union, The Debate on Providing Aid. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 Jan 1992.

Sutton, Ernest L., The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make it Work, Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 1992.

Zinni, Antony. BG. USMC Chief of Staff, Operation Provide Comfort. Operational Summary Statement, 22 January 1992.

Zinni, Anthony, MG, USMC. The Field Commander's Perspective of Peacekeeping. The Secretary of State's Open Forum. Washington DC: OSD, 1994.